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ABORIGINAL TITLE, ALASKAN NATIVE PROPERTY




Few cases have affected the course of Indian law as greatly as
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.' Decided in 1955, it was
the culmination of a line of Supreme Court decisions concerning
aboriginal title, its status as "property," and the effect on that
status of various kinds of "recognition." Plaintiffs were a group
of Alaskan natives seeking compensation under the fifth amend-
ment for a "taking" by the United States of timber from lands
the plaintiffs claimed by aboriginal title. Denying that compensa-
tion was due, the Court declared that absent specific recognition
as such by treaty or act of Congress, aboriginal title is not a prop-
erty interest within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
Recent scholarship has charged that Tee-Hit-Ton wrongly
decided the issues presented. 2 Ironically, the issues the Court
claimed to have decided probably were not presented in the first
place. Through the combined misunderstanding of Court and
counsel, most of the relevant issues in the case were never ad-
dressed. Instead, counsel argued and the Court "decided" a case
that bore little resemblance to the one properly before the Court.
Shortly after Alaska was acquired, Congress deliberately did
not provide Alaskan native lands the legislative protection tradi-
tionally afforded Indian lands elsewhere.3 Adopting a different
policy in Alaska, Congress refused to protect aboriginal title per
se, although it did act to protect native possession. Through
special legislation, most significantly the 1884 Alaska Organic
Act,4 Congress created various imperfect rights in favor of both
© 1980 Steven John Bloxham
1. 348 U.S. 272 (1955), noted in 69 HARv. L. REv. 120, 148 (1955) and 8 ALA. L.
REv. 170 (1955).
2. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD 141-44 (1980); Henderson, Unraveling
the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDLN L. REV. 75 (1977); Newton, At the Whim of
the Sovereign, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (1980). See Hookey, The Gove Land Rights Case:
A Judicial Dispensation for the Taking of Aboriginal Lands in Australia?, 5 FED. L. REv.
85, 99-102 (1972); Mickenberg, Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United States, 9
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 119, 135-38 (1971).
3. Most provisions of the 1834 Intercourse Act, Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4
Stat. 729, particularly section 12, 25 U.S.C. § 177, have never been in effect in Alaska.
4. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat. 24.
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natives and nonnatives occupying lands in Alaska. These rights
closely paralleled, but were conceptually distinct from, aboriginal
title.
Just eight years before the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had held that rights created by the 1884
Organic Act were "compensable" property under the fifth
amendment, although it also held that all aboriginal title in
Alaska had been extinguished in 1867.1 The Supreme Court in
Tee-Hit-Ton misread this decision as having upheld compensa-
tion for a taking of aboriginal title and disapproved of it. The
Court then held that the 1884 Act was not sufficient recognition
of aboriginal title so as to compel compensation under the
"recognition" test it announced. It never realized that for nearly
sixty years both it and the Ninth Circuit had construed the 1884
Act as having created nonaboriginal rights.
Largely because of this confusion by the Court, and a natural
tendency to focus on aboriginal title whenever Indian land is con-
cerned, non-Alaskan courts and commentators usually have
failed to perceive the unique footing upon which Alaskan native
property fights have rested. This article will attempt to eliminate
this confusion through analysis of relevant legislation and case
law. After a brief overview of legislation affecting native rights in
Alaska, the significance and applicability of the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Acts in Alaska will be discussed. The existence and
character of the property fights of Alaskan natives under the
1884 Organic Act will be explored, and a theory of the relation-
ship between these fights and aboriginal title proposed. The cases
leading up to the Tee-Hit-Ton decision will be discussed, and
Tee-Hit-Ton will be criticized based upon Alaskan and non-
Alaskan legal precedent. In conclusion, it will be suggested that
Alaskan tribes still hold vested rights to lands in Alaska, notwith-
standing either Tee-Hit-Ton or the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act of 1971,6 and that Tee-Hit-Ton either should be over-
ruled or limited to its facts and, therefore, have little but
historical relevance either inside or outside of Alaska.
Alaska and Alaskan Natives: An Overview
Since time immemorial Alaska has been inhabited by the
peoples now known generally as the Tlingits, Athapascans,
5. Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947).
6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1971).
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Eskimos, and Aleuts.7 The first Europeans to record contact with
them were members of the Russian exploration expedition of
Vitus Bering in 1741. The expedition reported finding large
numbers of sea otters and fur seals, and before long, hoards of
Russian fur hunters arrived to exploit the newly discovered
wealth. The Russian-American Company was formed in 1799,
and until 1867 it not only enjoyed a monopoly on the fur trade
but exercised powers of government over such Russian possessions
as there were in Alaska. Aside from fur traders, the Russian
presence was limited to scattered churches and townsites, mostly
in southeastern Alaska."
Russia ceded its rights in Alaska to the United States in 1867.1
The treaty of cession provided that, with the exception of "the
uncivilized native tribes," all inhabitants who chose to remain in
Alaska would become United States citizens. I0 The "uncivilized"
tribes, on the other hand, were declared to be "subject to such
laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to time,
adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country."" The treaty
therefore implicitly divided natives into two categories, "un-
civilized" and "civilized," and ordained federal citizenship for
the latter. 2
7. Congressional legislation relating generally to Indians applies to all four groups,
while legislation relating specifically to Alaska often distinguishes among Indians (Tlingits
and Athapascans), Eskimos and Aleuts. United States v. Native Village of Unalakleet,
411 F.2d 1255 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Compare Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 379, 44 Stat. 629, pt.2
(repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 703(a), 90 Stat. 2790 (1976)) (Indians and Eskimos)
with Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 304, 52 Stat. 593 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, §
704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976)) (Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts).
8. H. CHEVIGNY, RussIAN AMERICA (1979); E. GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA
1-29 (2d ed. 1968).
9. Treaty of Cession of Russian America, Mar. 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15
Stat. 539. Russia's rights in Alaska were those stemming from discovery. See Lipan
Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 493 (1967). "[D]iscovery gave title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession." Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823). This title was "subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy." Id. at 585. Discovery "gave an exclusive right to extinguish the In-
dian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest." Id. at 587. See also the
discussion of McIntosh, infra at text accompanying notes 169-176. For excellent discus-
sions of the discovery doctrine, see Barsh & Henderson, supra note 2, at 31-49; Berman,
The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27
Bunn. L. REV. 637 (1978); Henderson, supra note 2, 82-109.
10. Treaty of Mar. 30, 1867, United States-Russia, art. 3, 15 Stat. 539.
11. Id.
12. In re Minook, 2 Alas. 200 (D. Alas. 1904). "Civilized" natives were those con-
sidered under Russian law as being Russian subjects, including Creoles and the "settled
19801
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1980
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
In 1884 the first Organic Act for Alaska extended the laws of
Oregon over Alaska, so far as applicable, and provided for the
appointment of a governor to sit in Sitka.' 3 Alaska was con-
stituted a land district, the general mining laws' 4 were declared to
be in force, and those who had already located claims were
allowed to perfect them." This was subject to the provision that
"the Indians or other persons" in Alaska "shall not be disturbed
in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation
or now claimed by them[,] but the terms under which such per-
sons may acquire title to such lands is reserved for future legisla-
tion by Congress."' 6 Occupied lands up to 640 acres being used
as missionary stations among the Indians were to "be continued
in the occupancy" of the missionaries "until action by
Congress." 7 A final proviso cautioned that "nothing contained
in this act shall be construed to put in force" in Alaska "the
general land laws of the United States." 8
Congress created the first Indian reservation in Alaska in 1891
when it set aside the Annette Islands Reserve for the Metlakatla
Indians, a band that had immigrated from British Columbia four
years earlier.' 9 Persons occupying lands in Alaska for purposes of
trade or manufacture were allowed to receive patents to such
lands not to exceed 160 acres, 20 but this rule did not extend to
lands "to which the natives of Alaska have prior rights by virtue
of actual occupation." ' 2' Provision was also made for entry of
lands for townsite purposes under the general townsite laws, with
tribes"; "uncivilized native tribes" were "those independent pagan tribes who
acknowledged no allegiance to Russia ..... Id. at 213-20. Cf. United States v. Lynch, 7
Alas. 568, 572 (D. Alas. 1927) (Tlingits classified as "uncivilized natives"). Federal
citizenship was granted to Indians generally by the Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat.
253. The Metlakatla Indians of the Annette Islands Reserve became federal citizens by the
Act of May 7, 1934, ch. 221, 48 Stat. 667.
13. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, §§ 1, 2, 7, 23 Stat. 24.
14. Rev. Stat. §§ 2318-2352 (codified in 43 U.S.C.).
15. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat. 24.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 15, 26 Stat. 1095 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 495).
The waters within 3,000 feet of the low mean tide of the islands were included in the
reserve by the Presidential Proclamation of Apr. 28, 1916, 39 Stat. 1777. The Supreme
Court subsequently interpreted the original reservation by Congress to include such
waters but made no mention of the 1916 proclamation. Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
20. Act of Mar. 3, ch. 561, § 12, 26 Stat. 1095.
21. Id. § 14.
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no more than 640 acres to be embraced within any one entry. 22
The homestead laws23 were extended to Alaska in 1898, but
homesteads were to be limited to 80 acres; and neither entries nor
acquisition of title to the shores of navigable waters were
authorized. 2 The act also delegated to the Secretary of the In-
terior authority to "reserve for the use of the natives of Alaska
suitable tracts of land along the water front of any stream, inlet,
bay or sea shore for landing places for canoes and other craft"
used by natives. 21
The second Organic Act in 1900 reorganized the civil govern-
ment of Alaska and moved its seat to Juneau.26 The act declared
that the "Indians or other persons conducting schools or mis-
sions" in Alaska should not be disturbed in the possession of
lands actually used or occupied, and directed the Secretary of the
Interior to survey and issue to religious societies patents to lands,
up to 640 acres, occupied by them as missionary stations among
the Indians.2"
Although applicable, the General Allotment Act of 188728 was
of little practical significance in Alaska. It authorized the creation
of allotments only out of lands that were part of an Indian reser-
vation; there were no Indian reservations in Alaska at the time.
Congress corrected this situation in 1906 when it authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to allot 160 acres of nonmineral land to
any Indian or Eskimo meeting certain qualifications. 29 Such per-
sons were given a preference right to secure an allotment to non-
mineral land they occupied. The allotments were to be inalienable
and nontaxable until otherwise provided.
In 1912 the third Organic Act provided for a territorial
22. Id. § 11 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 703(a), 90 Stat. 2790 (1976)). It has
been held that natives were not entitled to enter townsites under this section. Johnson v.
Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 2 Alas. 224 (D. Alas. 1904). But see Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 379,
§ 1, 44 Stat. 629 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 703(a), 90 Stat. 2790), which
authorized the issuance of deeds to Indians or Eskimos occupying tracts surveyed pur-
suant to section 11 of the Act of 1891.
23. Rev. Stat. §§ 2289-2317 (codified in 43 U.S.C.; some sections repealed by Pub.
L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787-88).
24. Act of May 14, 1898, ch. 299, § 1, 30 Stat. 409 (codified in 43 U.S.C.).
25. Id. § 10 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976)).
26. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 1, 31 Stat. 321.
27. Id. § 27 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 280a).
28. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339,
341-42, 348, 349, 381). See Nagle v. United States, 191 F. 141 (9th Cir. 1911).
29. Act of May 17, 1906, ch. 2469, 34 Stat. 197 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-203, §
18, 85 Stat. 710 (1971)).
19801
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legislature" and a nonvoting delegate to Congress." The act fur-
ther provided that "the Constitution of the United States, and all
the laws thereof which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the
same force and effect within [Alaska] as elsewhere in the United
States ... "I'
The newly created territorial legislature in 1915 enacted the In-
dian 'Village Act allowing any native village of at least forty per-
manent inhabitants to organize a municipal government." In
1926, Congress provided for the issuance of deeds to lands set
apart for Indians and Eskimos within townsites entered and
surveyed pursuant to the Act of 1891, and for the survey and
conveyance of patents to Indians and Eskimos occupying non-
mineral lands within existing towns and villages. 4 The title con-
veyed was inalienable without the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior and not subject to taxation, levy and sale, or claims
of adverse occupancy.35
The self-government provisions of the 1934 Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act were not applicable to Alaska until 1936.36 Because of
differences in organization between communities of Alaskan
natives and Indian tribes elsewhere, Congress allowed that
groups of Indians in Alaska not heretofore recognized as bands
or tribes, but having a common bond of occupation, or
association, or residence within a well-defined neighborhood,
community, or rural district, may organize to adopt constitu-
tions and bylaws and to receive charters of incorporation and
Federal loans under [the Indian Reorganization Act].37
Congress also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
designate as an Indian reservation any land previously "reserved"
for the use of Indians or Eskimos, together with adjacent public
lands or those occupied by Indians or Eskimos. 8 Two years later
30. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 387, § 4, 37 Stat. 512.
31. Id. at § 17.
32. Id. § 3.
33. Act of Apr. 21, 1915, ch. 11, 1915 Alas. Sess. Laws, p. 24, amended by Act of
May 1, 1917, ch. 25, 1917 Alas. Sess. Laws, p. 47, repealed by Act of Apr. 13, 1929, ch.
23, 1929 Alas. Sess. Laws, p. 45.
34. Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 379, 44 Stat. 629 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, §
703(a), 90 Stat. 2790 (1976)).
35. Id.
36. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, amended by Act of May 1, 1936, ch.
254, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79).
37. Id.
38. Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 254, § 2, 49 Stat. 1250 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579,
§ 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976)).
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the secretary was also given the authority to reserve tracts of up
to 640 acres of the public domain for "schools, hospitals, and
such other purposes as may be necessary" to administer the af-
fairs of Alaskan Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. 9
Alaska's long road to statehood ended in 1959 with its admis-
sion to the Union. The Statehood Act40 contained two important
provisions affecting Alaskan natives. First, the state disclaimed
all right and title to any lands or other property ... (including
fishing rights), the right or title to which may be held by any
Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts... or is held by the United States
in trust for said natives ... [which] lands or other property...
shall be and remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control
of the United States.4 '
Second, the act provided that "the State of Alaska is hereby
granted and shall be entitled to select, within twenty-five years"
more than 103 million acres of "vacant, unappropriated, and
unreserved" public lands.4 2 The second was probably the more
important of the two provisions because it set the stage for the
battle which culminated in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act. 43
In 1961 the Bureau of Indian Affairs filed the first of a flood
of native protests over state selections; within a decade between
80 and 90 percent of the land in Alaska was subject to native pro-
tests or other claims.4 4 When, in 1966, natives protested the
federal sale of oil and gas leases on the North Slope, Interior
Secretary Udall responded by suspending the lease sale and freez-
ing the disposition of all federal land in Alaska until native claims
were settled. 4 After oil was discovered at Prudhoe Bay and the
Alaska Pipeline proposed,
39. Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 304, 52 Stat. 593 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, §
704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976)).
40. Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (codified at 48 U.S.C.
prec. § 21 note).
41. Id. § 4.
42. Id. § 6.
43. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628.
44. Block, Alaskan Native Claims, 4 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 223, 223 (1971) estimates
80 percent, based upon claims of nearly 300 million of approximately 375 million acres in
Alaska. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, SPECIAL JOINT TASK FORCE
REPORT ON ALASKAN NATIVE IssuEs 6 (1976), estimates that claims totaled approximately
337 million acres, or 90 percent of the state.
45. The freeze was formalized Jan. 17, 1969, by Public Land Order 4582, 34 Fed.
Reg. 1025. It was extended Dec. 8, 1970, by Public Land Order 4962, 35 Fed. Reg.
1980]
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a strange troika coalition seeking settlement was created:
Natives seeking "title" to their aboriginal lands; the State of
Alaska seeking to clear Native title so it could select its lands;
the major oil companies-national and international-seeking
to clear Native title so that the "freeze" could be lifted and a
pipeline built.16
Congress responded in 1971 with the passage of the ,Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act.47 The Act extinguished all native
claims based upon aboriginal title, "if any," and authorized the
distribution of approximately 40 million acres of land and nearly
one billion dollars to Alaskan natives as compensation. 8 Natives
were authorized to organize twelve "regional corporations" and
nearly 300 "village corporations" to share the settlement. 49 Th6
shareholders of a village corporation are the members of the
village; likewise, the shareholders of a regional corporation are
those natives originating within the region.A0 Each village cor-
poration was to select and receive in fee simple the surface rights
to between 23,040 and 161,280 acres from the immediate
vicinity. 1 Regional corporations are to hold in fee simple the sub-
surface rights to village lands, together with both surface and
subsurface rights to additional lands selected from within each
region's boundaries.2
Settlement Act lands thus are to be held in a manner quite
unlike that of any Indian lands outside of Alaska. Land received
under the Settlement Act may be sold by its corporate owners,
but stock in regional and village corporations cannot be sold until
18,874, and June 17, 1971, by Public Land Order 5081, 36 Fed. Reg. 12,017. Public Land
Order 4582 was revoked by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §
1616(d)(1).
46. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 44, at 6.
47. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §
1601-1628). See generally, Lazarus & West, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: a
Flawed Victory, 40 LAW & CoNT. PROB. 132 (1976); Lysyk, Approaches to Settlement of
Indian Title Claims: The Alaskan Model, 8 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1973); Com-
ment, Charitable Donatiois under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 3 UCLA-
ALAS. L. REv. 148 (1973).
48. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605(a), 1608, 1611, 1613, 1615. The Metlakatla Indians of
the Annette Islands Reserve are not eligible for benefits under the Settlement Act. Id. §
1618(a). Other reservations were revoked, but the natives of such reservations were given
an option to acquire in fee simple the lands formerly within the reservations. Id. § 1618.
49. Id. §§ 1606, 1607.
50. Id. §§ 1606(g), 1607(a).
51. Id. §§ 1611(a) & (b), 1613(a) & (b), 1615.
52. Id. §§ 1611(d), 1613(e), (f).
[Vol. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/4
ALASKAN NATIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS
1991. 3 Except for land that is developed or leased to third par-
ties, Settlement Act lands are also exempt from state and local
real property taxes until 1991. 51 The corporations that own the
lands are creatures of state law; they are not entitled to sovereign
immunity as are tribes and with few exceptions are subject to tax-
ation like any other state-created corporation. 5
Alaska and the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts
It was not long after the ratification of the Constitution that
Congress adopted the first of a series of acts regulating trade and
intercourse with Indian tribes.56 The 1790 Intercourse Act decreed
that "no person shall be permitted to carry on any trade or inter-
course with the Indian tribes without a license for that purpose' 5 7
and provided as a penalty the forfeiture of any goods "as are
psually vended to the Indians" in the possession of any person
found "in the Indian Country" without a license.5 1 Perhaps the
act's most important provision was the one declaring that
no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of
Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person
or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of pre-
emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made
and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the
authority of the United States.59
"Indian country" was left undefined until it was set out by metes
and bounds in the 1796 Intercourse Act,"0 an approach that was
53. Id. §§ 1606(h), 1607(c). See Note, Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Analysis
of the Protective Clauses of the Act Through a Comparison With the Dawes Act of 1887,
4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 269 (1976).
54. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d).
55. Both regional corporations and village corporations are incorporated under state
law. Id. §§ 1606(d), 1607(a). Tax exemptions are found at id. § 1620. As to the sovereign
immunity of tribes from suit, see United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309
U.S. 506 (1940); Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457 F. Supp. 384 (D. Alas. 1978)
(Alaskan native village); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alas. 1977) (Metlakatla In-
dian community). Settlement Act corporations are subject to suit. See, e.g., Aleut Corp.
v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 417 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alas. 1976).
56. See generally F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS
(1962).
57. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 137. The act was a temporary measure
and was reenacted every three years until a permanent version was passed in 1802. Act of
Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139.
58. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137.
59. Id. § 4.
60. Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469.
19801
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unchanged in the 1799 and 1802 Intercourse acts.6'
The final Intercourse Act was passed in 1834.62 Its first section
provided:
That all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi,
and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the ter-
ritory or Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States
east of the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which
the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of
this act, be taken and deemed to be the Indian country.63
The act proscribed the operation of "any distillery for manufac-
turing ardent spirits,"164 and forbade any person to "sell, ex-
change, or give, barter or dispose of, any spirituous liquor or
wine to an Indian,"' 5 in the Indian country. It continued the
requirement of a license to reside or trade within the Indian coun-
try, 6 and declared that "no purchase, grant, lease, or other con-
veyance of lands, of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian
nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equi-
ty, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into
pursuant to the constitution." 67
Alaska as "Indian Country"
At the time of the enactment of the 1834 Intercourse Act the
United States included only that portion east of the Mississippi
River plus those portions known as the Louisiana Purchase6" and
the Red River Country.69 The rest of what is now the fifty states
was acquired through annexation in 1845 and 1898,70 by agree-
ment with Britain in 1846,' and through cessions from Mexico in
61. Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat.
139. Section 1 of the 1802 Act provided that the boundary line was to be altered
automatically should lands be ceded by tribes.
62. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729.
63. Id. § 1.
64. Id. § 21.
65. Id. § 20.
65. Id. § 4.
67. Id. § 12.
68. Comprising most of the Great Plains region west of the Mississippi River, ac-
quired by the Treaty of Apr. 30, 1803, United States-France, 8 Stat. 200.
69. The basin of the Red River of the North, acquired by the Convention of Oct. 20,
1818, United States-Great Britain-France, 8 Stat. 248.
70. Texas was admitted into the Union pursuant to the Joint Resolution of Mar. 1,
1845, 5 Stat. 797. Hawaii was annexed pursuant to the Joint Resolution of July 7, 1898,
30 Stat. 750.
71. Conflicting claims to the Oregon country by Britain and the United States were
settled by the Treaty of June 15, 1846, United States-Great Britain, 9 Stat. 869.
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1848 and 185372 and Russia in 1867. 73 Congress expressly extend-
ed the 1834 Intercourse Act over the Oregon territory in 185074
and the New Mexico and Utah territories in 1851, 7 but never
over Alaska, California, Hawaii, or Texas.
When an attempt was made in 1872 to enforce the liquor provi-
sions of the 1834 Act in Alaska in United States v. Seveloff,76 the
trial court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the 1834
Act had never been extended expressly to Alaska and, therefore,
was inapplicable. The United States District Attorney had argued
for the United States that Alaska was part of the Indian country,
both because it was inhabited by Indians and because the 1834
Act had been extended over Alaska, proprio vigore, at the time
of its cession from Russia.
The "Indian Country" is only that portion of the United States
or its territories, which has been declared to be such by an act
of congress. . . ."I It has been so common a habit of congress
upon the acquisition of territory to specially extend the laws of
the United States over it,... that if congress had intended this
or any other provision of the intercourse act to be in force in
Alaska, it would, in accordance with its common practice, have
so declared.... .
There was precedent for this holding in United States v. Tom, 9
where the supreme court of the Territory of Oregon had held that
the 1834 Intercourse Act had effect in Oregon only by virtue of
its having been extended by the Act of 1850.
72. The Mexican Cession by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, United
States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922; the Gadsden Purchase by the Treaty of Dec. 30, 1853, United
States-Mexico, 10 Stat. 1031.
73. Alaska was acquired by cession from Russia, Treaty of Mar. 30, 1867, United
States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539.
74. The Act of June 5, 1850, ch. 16, § 5, 9 Stat. 437, provided: "That the law
regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes east of the Rocky Mountains ....
as may be applicable, be extended over the Indian tribes in the Territory of Oregon ......
(Emphasis added.) Oregon Territory comprised what are now the states of Washington,
Oregon, and Idaho.
75. Act of Feb. 27, 1851, ch. 14, § 7, 9 Stat. 574. New Mexico Territory comprised
what are now the states of New Mexico and Arizona (except for the area added by the
Gadsden Purchase in 1853). Utah Territory encompassed what are now western Colorado
and the states of Utah and Nevada.
76. 27 F. Cas. 1021 (No. 16,252) (D. Or. 1872).
77. Id. at 1022.
78. Id. at 1024.
79. 1 Or. 26 (1853). Accord, Robinson v. Caldwell, 67 F. 391 (9th Cir. 1895).
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In 1873, Congress reacted by extending over Alaska sections 20
and 21 of the 1834 Intercourse Act. 0 Later that same year Con-
gress enacted the first Revised Statutes, collecting together all
public laws of a permanent and general nature. The 1873 Revised
Statutes repealed and reenacted all included provisions into
positive law and by implication repealed any provisions not in-
cluded. 1 Paradoxically, the Revised Statutes omitted the 1834
Intercourse Act's definition of Indian country but did not repeal
those sections of the 1834 Act that applied only in Indian coun-
try. One court ruled that this meant there was no longer any In-
dian country except within Indian reservations,8" but the Supreme
Court held otherwise in Exparte Crow Dog83 in 1883. The issue
in Crow Dog was whether a homicide of one Indian by another
Indian on the Sioux Reservation was within the provisions of
Revised Statutes §§ 2145 and 2146,84 which, by their terms, apply
only to Indian country. The Court held that the killing had been
committed within Indian country and was therefore not
punishable by other than the Sioux Tribe. Six years earlier in
Bates v. Clark"3 the Court had held that:
[A]ll the country described by the act of 1834 as Indian country
remains Indian country so long as the Indians retain their
original title to the soil, and ceases to be Indian country
whenever they lose that title, in the absence of any different
provision by treaty or by act of Congress.8
The Court in Crow Dog held that this definition applied to
all the country to which the Indian title has not been extin-
guished within the limits of the United States, even when not
within a reservation expressly set apart for the exclusive occu-
80. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 510, 530.
81. Rev. Stat. § 5596.
82. Forty-three Cases of Cognac, 14 F. 539 (C.C.D. Minn. 1882).
83. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
84. Section 2145 is derived from section 25 of the 1834 Intercourse Act, Act of June
30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, and provides: "Except as to crimes, the punishment of
which is expressly provided for in this Title, the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of crimes committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country."
Rev. Stat. § 2146 provides that "The preceeding section shall not be construed to extend
to [crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor
to] any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by
the local law of the tribe . . . ." These two sections are now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
85. 95 U.S. 204 (1877).
86. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/4
ALASKAN NATIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS
pancy of Indians, although much of it has been acquired since
the passage of the act of 1834, and notwithstanding the formal
definition in that act has been dropped from the statutes, ex-
cluding, however, any territory embraced within the exterior
geographical limits of a State, not excepted from its jurisdic-
tion by treaty or by statute, at the time of its admission into the
Union, but saving, even in respect to territory not thus ex-
cepted and actually in the exclusive occupancy of Indians, the
authority of Congress over it, under the constitutional power
to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, and under any
treaty made in pursuance of it."'
Although this definition seems to include Alaska, a circuit
court three years later in Kie v. United States" ruled that Alaska
was not Indian country except for purposes of sections 20 and 21
of the 1834 Intercourse Act. Kie had been convicted of man-
slaughter, alleged to have been committed in 1884 in Juneau. On
appeal he argued that the killing had taken place within Indian
country and was therefore not punishable pursuant to sections
2145 and 2146 of the Revised Statutes. Noting the Seveloff case
and the subsequent extension of sections 20 and 21 over Alaska
by Congress, the court concluded that "this legislation . .. is
equivalent to a declaration that Alaska is not to be considered
'Indian country,' only so far as concerns the introduction and
disposition of spirituous liquors therein."89
The Intercourse Acts in Alaska
Whether a particular area of Alaska is Indian country is now
largely a question of only academic interest. As amended in 1958,
Public Law 28090 granted Alaska civil and criminal jurisdiction
87. 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883).
88. 27 F. 351 (C.C.D. Or. 1886). Section 23 of the 1834 Intercourse Act, providing
for the use of military force to apprehend persons in Indian country in violation of any
provision of the 1834 Act, was applicable in Alaska by implication of the extension there
of sections 20 and 21. Waters v. Campbell, 29 F. Cas. 412 (No. 17,265) (C.C.D. Or.
1877); In re Carr, 5 F. Cas. 115 (No. 2432) (D. Or. 1875). Sections 20 and 21 were re-
pealed by implication by the more stringent liquor provisions of section 14 of the 1884
Alaska Organic Act, Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24. United States v. Warwick,
51 F. 280 (D. Alas. 1892); United States v. Nelson, 29 F. 202 (D. Alas. 1886). The sale or
gift of liquor or firearms to Indians, including Alaskan natives, was forbidden by the Act
of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 429, § 142, 30 Stat. 1253, 1274.
89. 27 F. 351, 353 (C.C.D. Or. 1886). Accord, 14 Ops. Att'y Gen'l 290 (1873); 16
Ops. Att'y Gen'l 141 (1878); F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 350 (1942, rprnt. 1971).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360. Amended to include Alaska by the Act of
Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545.
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over all Indian country in that state; the issue should not arise
again unless the state retrocedes such jurisdiction.
The applicability of most provisions of the 1834 Intercourse
Act in Alaska has never been considered directly by the courts.
Substantial judicial authority, as well as congressional practice,
indicates that particular provisions are not in effect unless they
have been expressly extended." Congress did extend two sections
of the 1834 Act in 187392 and, by enactment of 18 U.S.C. sec-
tions 1151-1165 in 1948, made applicable certain criminal provi-
sions of the 1834 Act.93 However, neither Congress nor the courts
have ever declared the balance of its provisions to be in effect in
Alaska.
It seems anomalous that federal laws general on their face
should apply to one area within the United States but not to
another. The explanation of the courts, that laws must be extend-
ed expressly to newly acquired territory for them to apply, pro-
vides only a partial answer. Further explanation lies in the fact
that the Intercourse acts are an exercise of congressional power
under the Constitution to regulate commerce with the Indian
tribes. 4 Failure to extend the bulk of the provisions of the 1834
Act to Alaska reflected an apparent determination to regulate
commerce with Alaskan natives differently in some respects than
with Indian tribes elsewhere.
Native Property Rights in Alaska
By having failed to extend section 12 of the 1834 Intercourse
91. Robinson v. Caldwell, 67 F. 391 (9th Cir. 1895); Kie v. United States, 27 F. 351
(C.C.D. Or. 1886); United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021 (No. 16,252) (D. Or. 1872);
United States v. Tom, I Or. 26 (1853). Accord, Waters v. Campbell, 29 F. Cas. 412 (No.
17,265) (C.C.D. Or. 1877); In re Carr, 5 F. Cas. 115 (No. 2432) (D. Or. 1875). See United
States v. Santa Fe Pac. Ry., 314 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1941); United States v. Candelaria, 271
U.S. 432, 441-42 (1926); United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876). See also Act of June
5, 1850, ch. 16, § 5, 9 Stat. 437, set out supra, note 74.
92. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 510, 530, extended sections 20 and 21 of
the 1834 Act to Alaska. See also note 88 supra.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1152, concerning crimes applicable in Indian country, is derived
from section 25 of the 1834 Act; section 1160, concerning reparation to Indians whose
property has been the subject of a crime by a white person, is derived from section 16 of
the 1834 Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines Indian country in terms substantially different
from its predecessor, section 1 of the 1834 Act, while section 21 of the 1834 Act, pro-
hibiting the dispensation of liquor in the Indian country, is found substantially revised at
18 U.S.C. § 1154.
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Act to Alaska,95 Congress declined to deny Alaskan natives the
power to alienate their lands. Alaskan natives did in fact alienate
lands, and courts upheld the transfers except in cases where the
federal government sought to set aside the conveyances as fraud-
ulent.96 The transfers were not of aboriginal title, however, but
of rights created by special congressional legislation. The most
important of these rights were created by section 8 of the 1884
Alaska Organic Act.9 7
Judicial Interpretation of the 1884 Organic Act
One of the earliest cases to interpret the 1884 Act suggested
that it was express recognition of the "right of the American
citizen to go onto public lands, occupy, possess, use, and improve
the same, with the view of ultimately obtaining title." 98 The court
appears to have been referring to a settler's right of preemption
on the public domain.9 9 The case was cited with approval by the
Supreme Court in 1889 in Malony v. Adsit,'00 an action to
recover possession of a tract of land in Juneau. There the Court
found that "for more than nine years prior to April 29, 1891
[plaintiff] and his grantors were the owners by right of prior
occupancy and actual possession of the land in dispute."'' The
defendant claimed that the complaint was defective under the
applicable rules of pleading because it had failed to plead "the
nature of [plaintiff's] estate in the property, whether it be in fee,
for life or for a term of years." 101 The Court held for the plain-
tiff, explaining that "[iun the condition of things in Alaska under
the act of May 17, 1884, . . . the only titles that could be held
were those arising by reason of possession and continued posses-
sion, which might ultimately ripen into a fee simple title under
95. 25 U.S.C. § 177, set out in text accompanying note 67, supra.
96. United States v. Cadzow, 5 Alas. 125 (D. Alas. 1914); United States v. Berrigan,
2 Alas. 442 (D. Alas. 1905).
97. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat. 24. See text accompanying notes 13-18,
supra.
98. Carroll v. Price, 81 F. 137, 139 (D. Alas. 1896).
99. Under the preemption laws, Rev. Stat. §§ 2257-88 (codified in 43 U.S.C.), a
citizen might settle on lands subject to preemption and obtain a right of first purchase to
such lands. This right was assertable against third parties, but not against the federal
government until all preliminary acts, including payment of the purchase price, are per-
formed by the settler. See Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 330 (1875); Yosemite
Valley Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 77 (1872).
100. 175 U.S. 281 (1899).
101. Id. at 28.
102. Id.
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letters patent ...when Congress might so provide."'0 3
Six years later in Russian-American Co. v. United States, 04 the
Supreme Court found it "quite clear" that section 8 of the 1884
Act had "recognized the rights of such Indians or other persons
as were in possession of lands at the time of the passage of the
act, and reserved to them the power to acquire title thereto after
future legislation had been enacted by Congress." 05 In that case
the packing company had settled and erected improvements on
Afognak Island in 1889. When later that year the United States
reserved the island as a fish culture station, the company claimed
that it had a vested right to a patent under section 8 of the 1884
Act. The Court responded that since the company "did not take
possession of this land until five years after the act 6f 1884 was
passed, it was a mere trespasser."' ' 0 6
The packing company also claimed rights under the Act of
March 3, 1891, providing for the issuance of patents to persons
occupying lands "for the purpose of trade or manufactures." 0 7
The Court replied that "although the occupation and cultivation
of public lands with a view to preemption confers a preference
over others in the purchase of such lands by the bona fide
settler," it conferred no rights against the United States. 08 "Such
a vested right, under the preemption laws, is only obtained when
the purchase money has been paid. .... -"9
It is clear that the Court did not think that the 1884 Organic
Act had "recognized" a settler's preemptive rights because it
clearly recognized that such rights could be acquired only by set-
tlers under the preemption laws, providing for the settlement and
sale of the public domain. "[Flar from Congress intending by
this act to invite a settlement upon public lands in Alaska, a con-
trary inference arises from a subsequent clause of section 8, that
'nothing contained in this act shall be construed to put in force in
said JDistrict the general land laws of the United States.' 0I
103. Id. Accord, Haltern v. Emmons, 46 F. 452 (D. Alas. 1890), aff'd mem., 159
U.S. 252 (1894); Miller v. Blackett, 47 F. 547 (D. Alas. 1891).
104. 199 U.S. 570 (1905).
105. Id. at 576 (emphasis added). Accord, Young v. Goldsteen, 97 F. 303, 308 (D.
Alas. 1899); Miller v. Blackett, 47 F. 547 (D. Alas. 1891) (ejectment maintained against
United States deputy-collector of customs).
106. 199 U.S. 570, 576 (1905). Accord, Columbia Canning Co. v. Hampton, 161 F.
60, 64 (9th Cir. 1908).
107. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 12, 26 Stat. 1095.
108. 199 U.S. 570, 577 (1905).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 576.
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The leading case where the rights of natives under the 1884 Act
were at issue was Sutter v. Heckman.I' There a bill in equity was
brought to restrain the Alaska Packers Association from interfer-
ing with fishing rights inuring to certain uplands on the Tongass
Narrows. Plaintiffs claimed ownership of the land and fishing
rights through a chain of deeds originating in a quit-claim deed
from a native, alleged to have been in possession at the enactment
of the 1884 Act. The district court found that the original grantor
had in fact occupied part of the land claimed. As to that part, the
deed from the native had "conveyed his possessory rights and his
fishing rights, whatever they were . . . [which] should be pro-
tected under the act of Congress, to the same extent that they
would be under a patent, until the Congress of the United States
shall otherwise legislate."' 2
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in Heckman v.
Sutter."3 To the defendants' contention that the 1884 Act could
only have protected rights to land above the high water mark, the
court replied that the act "was sufficiently general and compre-
hensive" to include tidelands."'
It is well settled that the United States government, while it
holds country as a territory, . . . may . . . grant rights in or
titles to the tide lands of such territory as well as the public
lands above high-water mark. The case of Shiveley [sic] v.
Bowlby... leaves nothing more to be said on that question." 5
The circuit court in Heckman clearly considered the 1884 Act
to have been a grant of rights to persons in possession of lands.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in the Russian-American Co. case
declared that the Act had "reserved to [Indians and other per-
111. 1 Alas. 188 (D. Alas. 1901).
112. Id. at 200.
113. 119 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1902), aff'don reh., 128 F. 393 (9th Cir. 1904). Followed in
Worthen Lumber Mills v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 229 F. 966 (9th Cir. 1916)
(native grantor); McCloskey v. Pacific Coast Co., 160 F. 794 (9th Cir. 1908) (nonnative
grantor).
114. 119 F. 83, 88 (9th Cir. 1902), aff'd on reh., 128 F. 393 (9th Cir. 1904).
115. Id. (emphasis added). Shiveley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894), declared that:
"Congress has the power to make grants of lands below high water mark of navigable
waters in any Territory of the United States, whenever it becomes necessary to do so in
order to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands for
the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States, or to carry out other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the
United States hold the Territory." Heckman indicated that rights in tidelands were sub-
ject to the right of navigation over public waters. 119 F. at 88; 128 F. at 396-97. Accord,
Carroll v. Price, 81 F. 137, 142 (D. Alas. 1896).
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sons] the power to acquire title,"'' 6 indicating that such persons
had obtained vested rights to title. In 1947, in Miller v. United
States, the Ninth Circuit adopted the position that the 1884 Act
was a grant of such vested rights and held that these rights were
property interests requiring fifth amendment compensation for
their taking." 7 As recently as 1970, the Ninth Circuit cited its
holding in Heckman along with Shively v. Bowlby to support its
holding that the United States "[w]hile holding the country as a
territory . . . might even grant rights in and titles to lands which
normally would go to a state on its admission.""' 8
Comparison of the language of the three "dispositive" provi-
sions of section 8 of the 1884 Act supports such a construction of
a grant of vested rights to title. Persons with mining claims were
allowed to perfect them under the general mining laws, whereas
missionaries were only to be "continued in occupancy" pending
"action by Congress."" 9 Significantly, "Indians and other per-
sons" were to be protected in possession of lands actually used,
occupied, or claimed, with only "the terms under which such per-
sons may acquire title"' 20 reserved for future congressional
legislation.
The 1884 Organic Act and Aboriginal Title
It is important to note that none of the cases construing the
1884 Act distinguished between natives and other persons. It is
enlightening that the Ninth Circuit in its 1947 decision in Miller
upheld rights under the 1884 Act at the same time it explicitly
held that aboriginal title in Alaska had not survived the 1867
Treaty of Cession from Russia.' 2' In fact, until the Court of
Claims decision in Tee-Hit-Ton in 1954, no court had ever held
aboriginal title to exist in Alaska.'22
Although the 1884 Act did not distinguish between possession
by natives as individuals and as communities, the courts have
116. Russian-American Co. v. United States, 199 U.S. 570, 576 (1905).
117: 159 F.2d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1947).
118. United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1970). See also United States
v. Romaine, 255 F. 253, 259 (9th Cir. 1919).
119. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 8, 23 Stat. 24.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997, 1001-1002 (9th Cir. 1947); Treaty of Mar.
30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539.
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held that rights under the Act may vest in either.' 23 To the extent
that lands claimed by aboriginal title are coterminous with lands
in which communal rights are held under the 1884 legislation,
what is the effect of the 1884 Act on aboriginal title? It is possible
that the 1884 grants were merely intended to supplement the
natives' aboriginal claims, giving them alternative bases on which
to assert their rights. On the other hand, the grants may have
acted, either directly or through subordinating aboriginal tenure
to federal tenure, to supplant possessory rights under aboriginal
tenure with equal rights under federal tenure.
The classical concept of aboriginal title is that of a possessory
proprietary interest inuring in tribes by virtue of aboriginal use
and occupancy "from time immemorial." The right to possession
is held under aboriginal tribal tenure, not federal or state tenure,
until it might be legitimately extinguished, usually through ces-
sion by treaty to the United States in favor of the holder of the
"preemption right" or "naked fee."' 24 Such a cession to the
federal government is an intertenurial transfer of property, as
well as a cession of territory, and is the source of the right to
possession within the federal and state tenure systems.' 21
As we have seen, Congress declined to mandate this paradigm
of aboriginal rights in Alaska. It is instructive that not all tribes
hold their aboriginal lands by aboriginal tenure. The New Mexico
Pueblos hold much of their lands under grants from Spain, later
confirmed by the United States.'2 6
123. Heckman v. Sutter, 119 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1902) (individual); Johnson v. Pacific
Coast S.S. Co., 2 Alas. 224, 240 (D. Alas. 1904) (village).
124. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 517, 525 (1877); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543-44 (1832).
125. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 227 U.S. 355, 366 (1913); United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
126. Spanish policy, if not always practiced, was to grant to the Pueblos the lands
they occupied or claimed, and to forbid others to settle the lands or to purchase them
without official permission. H. BRAYER. PUEBLO INDIAN LAND GRANTs OF THE "Rio
ABAJO," NEw MExico 8-16 (1939); C. ROYCE, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 539-45 (1900). This policy was continued after Mexican independence in 1821,
with the Pueblos also enjoying rights of Mexican citizenship. BRAYER, supra, at 17-20.
After the Mexican-American War, most of the Southwest was ceded to the United States
by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Treaty of Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
Congress in 1854 ordered the investigation and report concerning the Pueblo land
claims. Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, § 8, 10 Stat. 308, 309. The claims of seventeen
pueblos were confirmed in 1858, and the lands patented to them in fee simple in 1864. Act
of Dec. 22, 1858, ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374; BRAYER, supra, at 21. See RoYcE, supra, at 920-23
and plates 44 & 46. The claim of the Pueblo of Santa Ana was confirmed by the Act of
Feb. 9, 1869, ch. 26, 15 Stat. 438.
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Since the land grants are not within any reservation, the
sovereign powers of the tribes are explainable only if they are
aboriginal, notwithstanding that the tribes are understood to hold
their titles in fee simple absolute, rather than by aboriginal
tenure.2 7 This suggests that a grant of a possessory interest to an
aboriginal possessor may effectively transform the aboriginal
quality of the right to possession.
It seems more than coincidence that within three years of the
1884 Organic Act, Congress forged a paradigmatic shift in its
general Indian policy. Through passage of the Major Crimes Act
of 1885128 and the General Allotment Act of 1887,129 Congress
clearly initiated a new policy of intervention in internal tribal af-
fairs, claiming the right to exercise jurisdiction over matters that
previously had been within the exclusive realm of the tribes. It is
suggested that the 1884 Organic Act was but another manifesta-
tion of this shift in Indian policy. By granting rights under federal
tenure to natives and others in Alaska, Congress asserted the
right to disregard the aboriginal tenure system and protect
possessory interests on its own terms. This is particularly ap-
parent considering that both native and nonnative possession was
protected on exactly the same te rms. Any conflict with aboriginal
rights is wholly abstract, however, because such grants are com-
pletely consistent with native possession. The conflict is not with
the aboriginal right to possession, which is protected, but with
the sovereign aboriginal right to determine tenure without inter-
ference by another sovereign. Even this conflict is more apparent
than real. As long as the United States asserts the right to forbid
transfer of tribal land and claims the right of eminent domain
over aboriginal lands, the difference between aboriginal title and
possessory rights under federal or state tenure is merely descrip-
tive, not substantive.
127. At present, the Pueblos reside on statutory and executive order reservations as
well as land grants, with the reservations carefully abutting the granted lands. See, e.g.,
Act of May 23, 1928, ch. 707, 45 Stat. 717 (Acoma Pueblo); Executive Order of Sept. 4,
1902, 3 KAPPLER, INDAN AFFAIRS 687 (1913) (Nambe Pueblo); Executive Order of July
29, 1905, 3 KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS 687-88 (1913) (Santa Clara Pueblo). The pueblos of
Picuris, Cochiti, Sandia, Isleta, Santa Ana, Santo Domingo, and San Juan are solely land
grants.
128. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
See ROYCE, supra note 126, at 920-23 and pl. 44, 46.
129. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339,
341-42, 348, 349, 381).
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The Intersections of Aboriginal Title and Alaskan
Native Property Rights
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Ry.
In 1941 in'United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Ry., '" the United
States brought suit on behalf of the Hualapai Tribe to enjoin
interference by the railroad with the tribe's possession and occu-
pancy of certain lands in Arizona that the tribe claimed by
aboriginal title. The railroad claimed title to the lands under a
grant from the United States to its predecessor in 1866,'1' but the
government asserted that the grant had conveyed title subject to
the aboriginal interest.
The Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit had held that the
United States had never recognized aboriginal title within the area
of the Mexican Cession and that absent such recognition
aboriginal title could not be asserted against a grantee of the
United States.'32 In a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Douglas, the Supreme Court rejected both this theory and the
railroad's theory that aboriginal title need be "based upon a trea-
ty, statute, or other formal government action.""' The Court
reasoned that if the Hualapais' aboriginal interest had not been
extinguished prior to the date the title of the railroad's
predecessor attached, then its predecessor "took the fee subject
to the encumbrance of Indian title."' 34 Disputing that the policy
of the United States "of respecting such Indian title" was nonex-
istent in the Mexican Cession, the Court pointed to the fact that
the 1834 Intercourse Act had been extended over the tribes in the
New Mexico and Utah territories in 1851. "The Act of 1851 ob-
viously did not create any Indian right of occupancy which did
not previously exist. But it plainly indicates that in 1851 Congress
desired to continue in these territories the unquestioned general
policy of the Federal Government to recognize such right of occu-
pancy." 135
The Court held that the Hualapais' aboriginal title had not
been extinguished by the time the railroad grant had attached in
1872; the railroad's predecessor therefore had taken the fee en-
130. 314 U.S. 339 (1941), reh. denied, 314 U.S. 716 (1942), noted in 10 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 753 (1942).
131. Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292.
132. 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941), reh. denied, 314 U.S. 716 (1942).
133. Id. at 347.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 347-48 (emphasis added).
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cumbered by aboriginal title. However, the Hualapais' subse-
quent request for and acceptance of a reservation in 1883 was
held to have been an effective abandonment of their aboriginal
interest outside the reservation. The railroad recently had quit-
claimed its interest in lands within the reservation to the United
States, and the Court accordingly ordered an accounting with
respect to only those lands. 3 ,
Tillamooks I and II
Five years later, in United States v. Alcea Band of
Tillamooks,1'" the Supreme Court was divided on the issue of
whether compensation was required for the taking by the United
States without tribal consent of lands held by aboriginal title.
Three Justices joined in the opinion of Chief Justice Vinson in re-
quiring compensation under the fifth amendment, finding that
"[a] contrary decision would ignore the plain import in tradi-
tional methods of extinguishing Indian title."' 38 Noting that the
"early acquisition of Indian lands, in the main, progressed by a
process of negotiation and treaty," and that it had been "usual
policy not to coerce the surrender of lands without consent and
without compensation," Vinson concluded that "[s]omething
more than sovereign grace prompted the obvious regard given to
original Indian title." 139
Two Justices joined in the dissenting opinion of Justice Reed,
adopting the theory of the United States that compensation was
required only where aboriginal title had received "some definite
act of sovereign acknowledgment."'"" According to the dissent:
The character of Indian occupancy of tribal lands is at least
of two kinds: first, occupancy as aborigines until that occupancy
is interrupted by governmental order; and second, occupancy
when by an act of Congress they are given a definite area as a
place upon which to live. When Indians receive recognition of
their right to occupy lands by act of Congress, they have a
right of occupancy which cannot be taken from them without
compensation. But by the other type of occupancy, it may be
136. The Court without explanation failed to order an accounting as to lands outside
the reservation for the period between 1872 and 1883. See 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 753,
755 (1942).
137. 329 U.S. 40 (1946) (Tillamooks 1).
138. Id. at 47.
139. Id. at 47-48.
140. Id. at 49.
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called Indian title, the Indians get no right to continue to oc-
cupy the lands.... 14 '
This view of aboriginal title was rejected by four of the seven
Justices who addressed the issue; seven out of eight Justices re-jected Justice Black's theory that the jurisdictional act under
which suit had been brought itself had compelled compensation;
and the Court was split four to four over Chief Justice Vinson's
contention that compensation was being awarded under the fifth
amendment.' 4 2 Nevertheless, some authorities read the case as
standing for a right to compensation under the fifth
amendment. 143 When Tillamooks came before the Court again
four years later on the issue of whether interest was required on
the award, the Court held per curiam that no interest was due
because it was not a fifth amendment case. 144
Miller v. United States
One year after the first Tillamooks opinion, in Miller v. UnitedStates, 5 the United States sought to use the Second War Powers
Act4 6 to condemn land in Juneau, Alaska. Certain natives filed
an answer alleging ownership of the land based upon possession
from time immemorial-aboriginal title. The lower court sus-
tained the government's demurrer to the answer, holding that
aboriginal title was not a compensable interest in land. On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit opined that aboriginal title was indeed a
compensable interest, citing Tillamooks I, but it held that any
aboriginal title in Alaska had been extinguished by the Treaty of
Cession from Russia in 1867.147 Nevertheless, the Court upheld
the natives' right to compensation based upon rights acquired
under the 1884 Alaska Organic Act.148 "In our opinion, the
141. Id. at 57-58 (Reed, J., dissenting).
142. Justice Jackson took no part in the decision. Chief Justice Vinson never express-
ly mentioned the fifth amendment, but it clearly was the basis for his opinion. Accord,
329 U.S. 40, 59-60 (1946) (Reed, J., dissenting). There was no other possible basis for
recovery except for the jurisdictional act. Both the lead and dissenting opinions expressly
held that the jurisdictional act had not required compensation. 329 U.S. at 45-46, 60.
143. Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 1947). See also, Cohen,
Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 56-58 (1947).
144. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 (1951) (Tillamooks II).
145. 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947).
146. Act of Mar. 27, 1942, ch. 199, § 201, 56 Stat. 177.
147. Treaty of Mar. 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539; 159 F.2d 997,
1001-1002 (9th Cir. 1947).
148. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat. 24. The Court impliedly overruled
United States v. Lynch, 7 Alas. 568 (D. Alas. 1927), which held that an allegation of
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language used [in the 1884 Act] is susceptible of but one construc-
tion; i.e. that congress guarantied [sic] to all persons in posses-
sion of lands in Alaska at that date the right ultimately to acquire
a perfect title to the same."' 49 Relying upon numerous cases con-
struing rights under the 1884 Act, the Court concluded that
"[s]uch rights are compensable; for their holders are neither
squatters nor outlaws."' 50
Miller got the Tlingit claimants to trial, but in United States v.
10.95 Acres of Land3 I the trial court held that compensation was
not due them after all because they had failed to show use or
occupancy which was "notorious, exclusive and continuous,...
[so] as to put strangers upon [actual] notice."'15 2 Miller's dictum
that aboriginal title was compensable was undermined by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Tillamooks II. Still, it was clear that
rights stemming from the 1884 Organic Act were compensable in-
terests under the fifth amendment, at least until the United States
Supreme Court spoke on the matter.
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States
The Supreme Court finally did address the question of Alaskan
natives' interests in land in 1955 in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States.'53 There a clan of Tlingits sought fifth amendment
compensation for a sale, by the United States, of timber from
lands the clan claimed it held in aboriginal title. Faced with the
argument that their aboriginal interest needed to have been
specifically recognized by Congress to be compensable, the Tee-
Hit-Tons argued that the 1884 and 1900 Organic Acts' were suf-
ficient recognition. When the Supreme Court's opinion was
handed down, Justice Reed was at the helm of a six-to-three ma-
jority denying the Tee-Hit-Tons' claim. "No case in this Court
has ever held that the taking of Indian title or use by Congress re-
quired compensation," he declared.' 55 Restating the theory he
had urged in Tillamooks I, he found:
possession from time immemorial was not sufficient to raise an issue of fact regarding
possession as of May 17, 1884.
149. 159 F.2d 907, 1003 (9th Cir. 1947), quoting Young v. Goldsteen, 97 F. 303, 308
(D. Alas. 1899) (emphasis supplied in Miller).
150. 159 F.2d at 1003.
151. 75 F. Supp. 841 (D. Alas. 1948).
152. Id. at 843-44.
153. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
154. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat. 24; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 27,
31 Stat. 321.
155. 348 U.S. 272, 281 (1955). But see United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks,
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It is well settled that in all the States of the Union the tribes
who inhabited the lands of the States held claim to such lands
after the coming of the white man, under what is sometimes
termed original Indian title or permission from the whites to
occupy. That description means mere possession not specifical-
ly recognized as ownership by Congress. After conquest they
were permitted to occupy portions of territory over which they
had previously exercised "sovereignty," as we use that term.
This is not a property right but a right of occupancy which the
sovereign grants and protects against third parties .... "I
The theory that specific recognition of aboriginal title by treaty
or act of Congress was required for fifth amendment protection
had triumphed. The Court gave short shrift to the Tee-Hit-Tons'
contention that the 1884 and 1900 Organic Acts constituted
specific recognition of their claims.' 5 7 The Court also observed
that "[b]efore the second Tillamook case, a decision was made
on Alaskan Tlingit land held by original Indian title. Miller v.
United States. That opinion holds such a title compensable under
the Fifth Amendment on reasoning drawn from the language of
this Court's first Tillamooks case." ' Justice Reed disposed of
Miller, however, by noting the Court's disapproval of that case in
a footnote in Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co.'59 in 1949, where it
had commented, per Justice Reed,
We have carefully considered the opinion in Miller v. United
States, where it is held, that the Indian right of occupancy is
compensable. With all respect to the learned judges, familiar
with Alaska land laws, we cannot express agreement with that
conclusion. The opinion upon which they.chiefly rely [citing
Tillamooks 1], is not an authority for this position. That opin-
ion does not hold the Indian right of occupancy compensable
without specific legislative direction to make payment.' 60
341 U.S. 40 (1946); Cohen, supra note 143. Justice Reed sidestepped Tillamooks I by
misreading it: "We think it must be concluded that the recovery in the Tillamook case
was based upon statutory direction to pay for the aboriginal title in the special jurisdic-
tional act . . . ." 348 U.S. at 284. This is clearly erroneous, as seven Justices in
Tillamooks I, including Justice Reed, had rejected the jurisdictional act as a basis of
recovery. Accord, Mickenberg, supra note 2, at 137. See supra note 142.
156. 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
157. Id. at 278.
158. Id. at 282 (emphasis supplied).
159. 337 U.S. 86 (1949).
160. Id. at 106 n.28 (emphasis supplied).
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The Court concluded that "[tihis leaves unimpaired the rule" it
claimed to derive from Johnson v. McIntosh, 6' "that the taking
by the United States of unrecognized Indian title is not compen-
sable under the Fifth Amendment."' 62
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas adopted the Tee-Hit-
Tons' argument and insisted that "[t]he conclusion seems clear
that Congress in the 1884 Act recognized the claims of these In-
dians to their Alaskan lands."' 63 However, neither the majority
nor the dissent cited any case law pertaining to the 1884 Act ex-
cept for Miller, which the majority misread and the dissent never
mentioned.
The majority appeared confident in ruling against the Tee-Hit-
Tons. "Our conclusion does not uphold harshness as against
tenderness toward the Indians, but it leaves with Congress, where
it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the termination of
Indian occupancy of Government owned land rather than making
compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle.' ' 64
Congress eventually was more sympathetic toward the Alaskan
natives than the Supreme Court and legislated the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act,' 65 but the Tee-Hit-Ton decision remains
as the leading case on aboriginal title and the fifth amendment.
Ironically, the Court was probably correct in denying the Tee-
Hit-Tons' aboriginal title claims, but it was entirely mistaken as
to the applicable law.
The Tee-Hit-Ton Case Examined
The Tee-Hit-Ton decision is but one of many deciding what is
"property" for the purpose of the fifth amendment. The ap-
proach adopted by the Court to dispose of the Tee-Hit-Tons'
claim, i.e., denying that the interest involved constitutes "proper-
ty," has been used often in cases involving the navigation ser-
vitude,' 6" zoning restrictions,167 and regulation of economic ac-
161. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
162. 348 U.S. 272, 284 (1955).
163. Id. at 294 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 290-91.
165. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28.
166. E.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
167. E.g., H.F.H., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508 (1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 904 (1976); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, app.
dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
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tivity.' " Use of the "no property" approach in Tee-Hit-Ton was
a radical departure from its use in these contexts where claims to
uses of real property of acknowledged ownership were at issue. In
Tee-Hit-Ton, ownership of the realty itself was the basic dispute.
Aside from the Court's basic approach to the fifth amend-
ment, Justice Reed's analysis in Tee-Hit-Ton suffers from three
fundamental errors that render his analysis extremely ques-
tionable. First, Reed's reliance upon Johnson v. McIntosh'69 to
support his "well-settled" propositions regarding aboriginal title
has caused perplexity and confusion in the theory of aboriginal title
ever since."17 Far from being "derived" from McIntosh, as Reed
urged, the rule of Tee-Hit-Ton actually is at odds with that case.
In McIntosh, plaintiffs sued for ejectment of defendant, who
held the land in question under a grant from the United States.
Plaintiffs claimed ownership of the land by purchase from an In-
dian tribe made prior to the cession of the land by the tribe,
through treaty, to the United States. Among several grounds of
decision,"7 ' the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' interest
had been eclipsed by the subsequent cession of the land involved
by the tribe. Chief Justice Marshall explained that "the person
who purchases lands from the Indians, within their territory,
incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property
purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to
their laws." ' 72 Although at the time it was a common practice for
168. E.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
169. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
170. See Henderson, supra note 2; Hookey, supra note 2, at 101.
171. The Court held plaintiffs' title invalid on at least two other grounds. The holding
most commonly referred to was that the tribes could not convey a complete title because
their "power to dispose of the soil, at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those
who made it." 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). But see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832), where Marshall reformulated the discovery principle: "It was an
exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among those who had agreed
to it .... It gave an exclusive right to purchase, but did not fdund that right on a denial
of the right of the possessor to sell." (Emphasis added.)
As a second ground for decision in McIntosh, the Court held that the Royal Proclama-
tion of 1763, applicable because plaintiffs' purchases had been before the American
Revolution, had reserved the lands claimed by plaintiffs to the tribes and forbidden pur-
chase by British subjects. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574-78. The 1763 Proclamation is still in
effect in Canada, although evidently not in the far northern or western portions of the
country. See Mickenberg, supra note 2, at 142. Portions of the proclamation are
reprinted, id. at 155-56.
172. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 593 (1823).
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tribes expressly to reserve in a treaty of cession any prior vested
rights they wished to protect,'7 the treaty involved in McIntosh
did not contain any such provision. 74 Marshall held that the treaty
therefore had operated to eclipse the plaintiffs' interest and to
transfer the lands to the United States free of any encumbrance.
The cession by the tribe without reservation of plaintiffs' rights
had been an act of eminent domain. According to Marshall, "If
they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise
and set aside the proceeding. We know of no principle which can
distinguish this case from a grant made to a native Indian. ..,,
In McIntosh, Marshall explicitly recognized that a tribe's
aboriginal proprietary interest exists within its own tenure system.
This tenure system is not only separate from that of the federal
government, but is actually a source of rights to the federal
tenure system. 176 In Tee-Hit-Ton, Reed assumed that all rights
were held under federal tenure. Failing to find an aboriginal pro-
perty interest within federal tenure, Reed declared that specific
congressional action was required to create one. According to one
commentator:
[T]he Court inaugurated a new judicial test of aboriginal prop-
erty: the legal theory that Congress has the sole right to
delegate to the Indian tribes their rights to aboriginal titles.
Aboriginal title did not exist, then, because of the tribes'
"original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil
from time immemorial," as stated in Worcester. Rather, under
the Court's new theory of aboriginal title, it was vested in Con-
gress. '"'
Second, Justice Reed failed to consider that the "specific
recognition" test he championed in Tillamooks I and Tee-Hit-
Ton also had been urged upon the Court in United States v. San-
ta Fe Pacific Ry. ,1 where the Court unanimously had rejected it.
The Court there held that the railroad grantee had received fee ti-
173. Id. at 598. Accord, Barsh & Henderson, supra note 2, at 46 & n.63. See, e.g.,
Treaty with the Wyandot of Sept. 29, 1817, art. 8, 7 Stat. 160; Treaty with the Cherokee
of Feb. 27, 1819, art. 3, 7 Stat. 195; Treaty with the Choctaw of Oct. 18, 1820, art. 9, 7
Stat. 210.
174. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 594 (1823).
175. Id. at 593. Accord, Jackson v. Porter, 13 F. Cas. 235 (No. 7143) (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1825).
176. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 227 U.S. 355, 366 (1913); United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
177. Henderson, supra note 2, at 112-13 (footnotes omitted).
178. 314 U.S. 339, 34547 (1941), reh. denied, 314 U.S. 716 (1942).
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tie from the United States encumbered by the Hualapais'
aboriginal title. The Court years earlier had held that a grant in
fee of aboriginal title lands operates to convey the fee en-
cumbered by aboriginal title.179 The Court in Santa Fe upheld this
result even where "a tribal [aboriginal title] claim to any par-
ticular lands [is not] based upon a treaty, statute, or other formal
government action." 180
It is submitted that a possessory encumbrance on a fee simple
estate, which also is indefeasible by the holder of the fee, is tanta-
mount to "property" by any generally applicable definition. This
being so, Santa Fe implicitly precluded any requirement of
"specific recognition" for such an interest to be compensable.
Santa Fe did not hold that recognition was never necessary,
however. Rather, the Court found that the extension of, inter
alia, sections 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the 1834 Intercourse Act over
the Territory of New Mexico clearly indicated Congress' intention
to continue there "the unquestioned general policy of the Federal
Government to recognize [the Indian] right of occupancy."' 81
When this is considered in light of the holding in Kie v. United
States'12 that only sections 20 and 21 of the 1834 Act were ever
extended over Alaska, it is apparent that Alaskan natives never
came within the policy of recognizing aboriginal title found by
the Court in Santa Fe, although they did receive protection from
other sources. Justice Reed, therefore, could have distinguished
Santa Fe by holding what it had implied, that Intercourse Act
protection was necessary for aboriginal title to be asserted as
property. At any rate, Tee-Hit-Ton can have decided nothing
more than that a taking of aboriginal title not subject to Inter-
course Act protection is not compensable. If the Court continues
to require "recognition," it remains to be seen whether the Inter-'
course acts might not be sufficient recognition of aboriginal title
so as to render it compensable property.
Finally, Justice Reed completely misread Miller v. United
States"s3 in both Tee-Hit-Ton and Hynes v. Grimes Packing
Co.'84 By no stretch of the imagination had Miller "held... that
179. Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55, 66 (1886). See, e.g., Beecher v.
Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877); Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 201 (1839).
180. 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941), reh. denied, 314 U.S. 716 (1942).
181. Id. at 348. Accord, Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton,
528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975) (section 12 of the 1834 Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177).
182. 27 F. 351 (C.C.D. Or. 1886). See infra, text accompanying notes 74-89 and
91-93.
183. 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947).
184. 337 U.S. 86 (1949).
1980]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1980
AMERICAN INDIA N LA W REVIEW
the Indian right of occupancy . . . is compensable" under the
fifth amendment.' 5 While it is true that Miller devoted an inor-
dinate amount of dictum to arguments' that aboriginal title is
compensable, the case clearly held that "the Tlingits' 'original In-
dian title' to the tidelands in question was extinguished" by the
1867 Treaty of Cession.' 6 Miller then went on to hold compen-
sable nonaboriginal rights arising under the 1884 Organic Act,
finding that the act had "been construed to constitute a Congres-
sional 'guarantee' to all persons in possession of lands in Alaska
on the date of its enactment, that they were not to be disturbed in
their occupancy." "7
Justice Reed's misreading dictum for holding seems bad
enough, but it is almost tragic that the Justice apparently never
understood what the Court in Miller did hold, i.e., that rights
arising under the 1884 Act, recognized by the Supreme Court
itself as early as 1899 and repeatedly regarded by the courts as
separate from the concept of aboriginal title, were compensable
under the fifth amendment. Justice Reed failed to discern that
these rights existed at all. It is also unlikely that Reed realized
that Miller held that aboriginal title in Alaska had been ex-
tinguished in 1867, even though the opinion of the Court of
Claims in Tee-Hit-Ton had specifically addressed this aspect of
Miller.' Ironically, Tee-Hit-Ton is considered to have overruled
this holding by implication.'89
Epilogue
Several years after the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, in United States
v. Alaslca, 90 the federal government brought suit to quiet title to
certain tidelands on the theory that it held them in trust for
natives under the 1884 Organic Act. The state claimed title under
the Tidelands Act,1'1 which granted all tidelands in Alaska, with
certain exceptions, to the state. The court held that lands subject
to claims under the 1884 Act came within the exception to the
grant of any land held "by the United States for the benefit of
any tribe, band, or group of [natives] or for individual
185. Id. at 106 n.28.
186. Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997, 1002 (1947).
187. Id. at 1003.
188. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 202, 206-207 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
189. United States v. ARCO, 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1019 n.42 (D. Alas. 1977).
190. 197 F. Supp. 834 (D. Alas. 1961).
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[natives].' 9 2 Affirming that rights under the 1884 Organic Act
had not been affected by Tee-Hit-Ton, the court declared that it
was "not here concerned with the matter of 'aboriginal title,' or
'recognized or unrecognized Indian title,' discussed by the
Supreme Court" in that case, but with the "right which was
specifically preserved in the Miller case."'' 93 After a trial on the
merits, however, the court held for the state, finding that the
natives' possession of the tidelands in question was not sufficiently
"notorious, exclusive and continuous, [and] ... substantial" to
warrant protection under the 1884 Organic Act. 94
Conclusion: Alaska-The Settlement Act and Beyond
Although the federal district court was able to see the irrele-
vance of the Tee-Hit-Ton decision to the congressional scheme of
land rights in Alaska, virtually everyone else, whether critical of
the case or not, accepted the underlying assumption of Tee-Hit-
Ton that the land rights of Alaskan natives must rest upon
aboriginal title alone. Thus, when the battle over native land
claims in Alaska mounted in the wake of Alaska statehood and
the subsequent discovery of oil, it was aboriginal title that the
natives claimed. It is possible that the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act extinguished only these aboriginal claims.'95 If
192. Id. § 455b.
193. 197 F. Supp. 834, 838-39 (D. Alas. 1961). The court seemed confused concerning
what right Miller had "preserved," equating it with the "right of occupancy ... first
recognized in the case of Johnson v. McIntosh," 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 197 F.
Supp. at 839. In its opinion after trial, however, the court restated its reliance upon
Miller, omitting any reference to McIntosh or other aboriginal title cases. United States v.
Alaska, 201 F. Supp. 796, 798 (1962).
194. United States v. Alaska, 201 F. Supp. 796, 800 (1962).
195. The extinguishment provision of the Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1603, reads in
part: "(b) All aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of aboriginal title .... are hereby ex-
tinguished. (c) All claims against the United States, the State, and all other persons that
are based on claims of aboriginal right, title, use, or occupancy... or that are based on
any statute or treaty of the United States relating to Native use and occupancy . . . are
hereby extinguished." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the extinguishment of aboriginal title and claims could not have affected
rights under the 1884 Organic Act. It is uncertain whether the extinguishment of all claims
based upon statutes relating to native use and occupancy affected 1884 Act claims. The
Senate version of the bill that became the Settlement Act, S. 35, contained language ex-
pressly extinguishing claims under the 1884 and 1900 Acts. This language was dropped in
committee to more closely approximate the House version, H.R. 10367, which eventually
was adopted. See United States v. ARCO, 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1027-1029 & n.58 (D. Alas.
1977), aff'd 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1980). Both the 1884 and 1900 Acts unofficially are
considered to be in force. See 25 U.S.C. § 280a (1900 Act); U.S.C.S. Uncodified Material
546, 566 (1884 Act; section 8 not listed as repealed).
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this is so, native tribes and individuals may continue to hold the
same vested rights to their lands as they have held since 1884.
The Tee-Hit-Ton Decision Outside of Alaska
The integrity of the judicial process demands that Tee-Hit-Ton
and its progeny be disregarded as precedent and that the
character of aboriginal title be considered anew, through prin-
cipled analysis of history and legal precedent. The scholarship of
the opinion is abysmally poor. Only the thin strands of ipse dixit
and judicial inertia are left to support a concept of aboriginal
rights wholly at odds with history and legal precedent.
If the Court refuses to overrule Tee-Hit-Ton, the case still
should have little relevance outside of Alaska. The Court in Tee-
Hit-Ton perhaps did have jurisdiction to decide that aboriginal ti-
tle might need "recognition" to be asserted against the United
States, but only if it first had decided that aboriginal title existed
in Alaska. As we have seen, the Court did this by assumption
(through the stipulation of the parties), and its determination was
unsupportable by, and probably at variance with, most applicable
precedent. Even if aboriginal title did exist in Alaska, the Court
could decide nothing more than that no statute applicable in the
case provided the requisite "recognition." As noted, the Inter-
course acts were not generally applicable in Alaska, and their ef-
fect therefore was not passed upon, either explicitly or implicitly.
If Tee-Hit-Ton stands, and recognition continues to be re-
quired, the Intercourse acts are a strong candidate for having suf-
ficiently recognized the proprietary nature of aboriginal posses-
sion. The Intercourse acts validated the prevailing discovery
paradigm of tribal rights. The discovery doctrine implicitly assumes
that tribal rights are proprietary, for only by their acquisition can
the holder of the "naked" fee obtain a fee simple absolute.
The impact of Tee-Hit-Ton on the law has been far-reaching,
both figuratively and geographically. The decision has been relied
upon in both Canada and Australia to justify takings of aboriginal
lands, and it effectively has forged a shift in the prevalent concept
of aboriginal property rights in the United States. That such a poor-
ly reasoned and researched opinion should have had such an impact
is an injustice to aboriginal peoples everywhere as well as a travesty
on the law. It is heartening that the International Court of Justice
recently has rejected not only the rule of Tee-Hit-Ton but the entire
doctrine of discovery as well.' 9 6
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There is little wisdom in a decision that sweeps so broadly as to
deny entire villages rights to lands they have occupied for cen-
turies in order to deny seventy persons a claim to all the timber
covering more than 350,000 acres of national forest. In all
fairness to the Court, it was never presented with the real issues in
the case, and thus perhaps was led blindly astray. It submitted
willingly to the chance to decide a question that had been burning
for more than twenty years. That chance was only an illusion, yet
it has been a powerful one. The time has come to set the illusion
aside.
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